

29 January 1952

Mr. Lee B. Wood
Executive Editor
New York World-Telegram
New York 15, New York

Dear Mr. Wood:

I appreciate your letter of 24 January 1952 with a set of proofs of Mr. David Snell's articles on Stalin's plan for aggrandizement. I have read these with great interest. I gather that the set you sent me completes the series, but if there are any more, I should be interested in having them.

It was a pleasure to have met you the other night at the Public Library and I appreciate what you had to say about my talk.


Sincerely yours,

Allen W. Dulles

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New York World-Telegram

The Sun



LEE B. WOOD
EXECUTIVE EDITOR

New York 15, N.Y.

January 24, 1952.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Following our conversation at the New York Library dinner last evening, here's a set of proofs on the Snell articles dealing with Stalin's plan for aggrandizement.

We are currently publishing these in the New York World-Telegram and Sun.

Again may I say how much I enjoyed your very illuminating talk Wednesday night.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Lee B. Wood', with a stylized, flowing script.

Lee B. Wood.

Allen W. Dulles, Esq.
2430 E. Street
Washington, D. C.

LBW:H
Encs.

HOLD FOR RELEASE

PRECEDENT STALIN—in this series of articles, reporter David Snell analyzes the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the light of Stalin's own writings. Little known in the United States, Stalin's "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question" was brought to the attention of the Scripps-Howard newspapers by Alice Widener of New York as a public service.

First of a Series.
By DAVID SNELL,
Staff Writer.

A quarter of a century ago Joseph Stalin revealed in detail his plan for world conquest.

That plan is today the foreign policy of the Soviet Union—a policy that has added 600,000,000 slaves to the Red empire in just five years.

Current developments in Asia and the Middle East bear living arms and testimony to the continuing success of the plan. Communism is spreading, despite all the efforts of the West to contain it.

Stalin's Grand Plan.

Here is Stalin's grand plan as revealed by him in writing and speech—words which the West apparently has not bothered to learn: 1. Gobble up the little nations on Russia's western border, securing the heartland of communism against counterattack from the West.

2. With the front door locked, conquer China by fraud, deception and bloody civil war.

3. Hand China the sword to conquer the rest of Asia for communism.

4. Foment revolution in the colonial and semicolonial lands of the Middle East.

5. Deny Asia's strategic war materials to the West and hand to communism an inexhaustible supply of cannon fodder.

6. When the West becomes exhausted through lack of supplies and commerce, strike at the teetering bastion of a free society and wipe it out.

West Miscalculates.

This strategy is fully revealed in Stalin's unexpurgated "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question," and a collection of speeches and papers by Stalin and other Communist leaders, entitled "China in Revolt."

These books laid bare his plan, step by step. They told precisely how China was to be captured—and how it was to become the biggest factor in revolutions in the rest of Asia.

They even brazenly told exactly how the West would—and finally did—miscalculate.

Exactly as Stalin planned it 25 years ago. "Operation Overthrow" is now in progress in nearly every country of the Asiatic and Middle Eastern target area—and is succeeding.

3-Stage Revolutions.

Ingenious in its simplicity, the operation builds revolutions in three stages:

Stage One. Native Communists—open and concealed—form alliances with nationalist movements, rallying the masses around such slogans as "Asia for the Asiatics!"

Stage Two. Having entrenched themselves and helped throw off Western influence or control, the Communists turn on native nationalist leaders. They destroy them with propaganda and/or bullets.

Stage Three. The Communists seize the state machinery—by one or more of these means:

1. Open military intervention by a "friendly" Soviet border state.

2. Civil war waged by an armed Communist party.

3. Skillfully manipulated coup d'etat.

How Scoreboard Reads.

"Whoever does not understand," wrote Stalin, "that there are no revolutions without definite stages of development . . . understands nothing . . . of Marxism . . ."

For the revolution in the so-called backward and colonial lands, this three-stage plan is the inflexible rule.

Here's how the scoreboard reads up to now:

China and Tibet: The three stages have run their tragic course.

Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Iraq and Morocco: Alliance with nationalism and hatred of the West, these countries are completing the first stage.

India: Her independence attained and her non-Communist

leadership under sharpening attack from the left, India is in the second stage.

The Philippines, Indo-China and Indonesia: Rattling with the sunfire of civil and guerrilla warfare, these countries are in the third stage.

Korea: With the first two stages completed, only the last-minute intervention of the United Nations staved off completion of stage three.

China Perils All Asia.

Meanwhile, the specter of China is haunting all Asia—and this, too, is just as Stalin planned. In "China in Revolt" there is the following:

" . . . liberated (Communist) China will become a magnet for all the peoples of the yellow race. . . . China will become a major power on the Pacific; it will become a menacing threat for the capitalist world . . ."

But the American imperialists are going to miscalculate—they are bound to miscalculate because they overlook the historical role which China is called upon to play in Asia and on the Pacific."

In the blueprint, Stalin called for "the creation in China of a big and powerful political and military army against imperialism and its agents."

This, too, has come to pass. Within the last few weeks the Chinese Nationalist government on Formosa learned through its intelligence that Red China has 5,000,000 front-line troops under arms and more than 10,000,000 others in reserve ready for action "on any front."

As Stalin planned, this army has a political role outside China's borders, as well as military.

Psychological Advantage.

By its very existence, the Chinese Red army gives strength and impetus to Communist revolutions that are now in progress, in their various stages, in non-Communist lands of Asia and the Middle East. This is the political role.

The military role has been manifested in Korea and Tibet, and, unless Red China is thwarted, could be manifested soon in other non-Communist borderlands.

Thanks to the political role of China's army, Communists everywhere in the target area enjoy a powerful psychological advantage that makes the fomenting of revolution all the easier. The ever-present possibility of invasion intimidates the anti-Communists. One needs courage bordering on foolhardiness to fight a local conspiracy that is backed by 5,000,000 soldiers just across a frail border!

U.S. Won't Face Reality.

The blueprint for today's history was drafted by Stalin a quarter of a century ago. Yet, a comparison of the blueprint with the foreign policy of the United States shows that our government has yet to face up to the realities of Stalin's revolutionary technique.

This reporter diligently searched the official policy declarations of the State Department, and the writings and public utterances of its officials and planners, but found not one direct reference to the books that contain the blueprint. Indeed, there was nothing to indicate even that the books had been read.

"The capitalist world sinks beneath the depths of the Pacific Ocean," Stalin wrote. "The Middle East and Asia, he said, are 'the roads to victory over the West.'"

Twenty-five years later Gen. of the Army Douglas MacArthur wrote:

"It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest. . . ."

Letter Brings Dismissal.

That was in the general's celebrated letter to Rep. Joseph W. Martin, house minority leader. When the letter was read into the Congressional Record last April, President Truman responded immediately by firing Gen. MacArthur.

Prior to that, Gen. MacArthur had the responsibility of implementing State Department policy in Asia.

Nevertheless, it can be revealed now for the first time, that the general's estimate of the role of Asia in the Communist grand design was based solely upon his own observations and understanding of power moves in that theater.

Now, for the first time, it can be revealed that Gen. MacArthur was never briefed by the State Department on the real nature of Russian design in Asia.

Gen. MacArthur Amazed.

Although those designs were made crystal clear in Stalin's books, the general's superiors in Washington never so much as called his attention to the Communist blueprint of world conquest.

This reporter recently visited Gen. MacArthur at his New York headquarters and laid before him Stalin's "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question" and "China in Revolt."

The general examined the books with astonishment, and then said: "I have never laid eyes on those books before. I was not even aware of their existence."

TOMORROW: The Blueprint.

HOLD FOR RELEASE

CHINA—Overnight—H. T. K.

Second of a Series.

By DAVID SNELL,

Staff Writer.

Late in December, 1945, Gen. George C. Marshall went to China as the State Department's special envoy. His mission: to persuade the Kuomintang to join the Chinese Communists in a coalition government.

Chiang Kai-shek, who burned his fingers in the 1920s playing with such a coalition, wouldn't buy it. The mission was a failure.

Nevertheless, Gen. Marshall got an "A" for effort, in the form of an appointment as Secretary of State. Chiang got the rug pulled from under him. The general slapped an embargo on shipment of arms to Nationalist China in the crucial period of 1946 and 1947—just when Chiang was licking the pants off the Communists.

Coalitions 'Necessary.'

Now about that coalition: did Gen. Marshall know that Stalin, at a closed State Department conference on foreign policy held in how a Communist-Kuomintang coalition could only further the Chinese revolution? Stalin wrote: snorting rather contemptuously "The masses must be mobilized and vigorously because one of our around the Kuomintang and the people asked them what they were Chinese Communist party. . . . going to give to China when this Temporary blocs and agreements (World War II) was over, and he with the bourgeoisie. . . . at a certain stage of the colonial revolution are not only permissible, but definitely necessary."

As far back as 1923, in accordance with a mandate of the Comintern, the Chinese Communists East, I think it's you. And I began planning to seize the state through a coalition with the Kuomintang.

A "united front," Red-style, was welded in September of that year, when the Kremlin sent Michael Borodin to Canton to become principal adviser to the Kuomintang and its founder, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Trumpeting the new-familiar theme of nationalism, the coalition was able to assume leadership of the revolutionary forces that were stirring in China.

Chiang Sees the Light.

But the Communists overplayed their hand. Under the influence of the ultra-left Leon Trotsky, the Chinese Communists demanded in 1927 a majority control of the Kuomintang.

Chiang, who had assumed leadership upon the death of Dr. Sun, saw the light. Realizing the sinister purpose behind the Communist "co-operation," Chiang dissolved the coalition and purged the Communists. Borodin fled to Russia.

It was then that Stalin read the riot act to the Comintern. Trotsky was ousted from the party in November, 1927, and his ultra-left, impatient policy was liquidated. But the damage had been done. The Communist cause in China was all but wrecked.

Stalin's Second Chance.

Speaking for Stalin, the Ukrainian Communist Dimitri Manuilsky analyzed the Chi-na effect for the Comintern. He made it clear that if the opportunity to win in China via a coalition ever came again the Communists would know how to utilize it.

"We are a world party which does not close its eyes to its own weaknesses and mistakes," Manuilsky declared.

That was in 1927. Eighteen years later Gen. Marshall sought, going to be until . . . the dust unwillingly to provide the Chinese settlers. Communists a second chance to complete their revolution without dations of Leninism. Stalin had firing a shot. And because Chiang said "no" he shut off his supply of arms!

Last June Secretary of State Denn Acheson told the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees that one objective of the Marshall mission was to bring about "a military reorganization and the integration of the Communist forces into the Nationalist government."

Just What Reds Wanted. Did either Mr. Acheson or Gen. Marshall know that, 18 years before the general went to China, Stalin had planned just such an integration? Stalin wrote: "The work of . . . Communist cells in the army must be intensified. . . . Intense work must be carried on with the help of concealed Communists. . . . This is fundamental for the success of the revolution. . . . This is fundamental for the creation of a big and powerful political and military array against imperialism and its agents. . . . Work must be intensified in the rear and within the divisions of Chiang Kai-shek in order to disintegrate them."

In 1945, pursuant to the Yalta agreement, the Soviet Union signed a treaty with Nationalist China, promising to support it fully and give no aid to the Chinese Communist armies. The then Secretary of State James F. Byrnes fairly bubbled over with joy. He

hailed the treaty as "an important step forward" and launched the Marshall mission on the unquestioning assumption that the treaty would be honored.

For-east Libscaulation. But 16 years earlier Stalin had declared himself on the subject of Russian aid to the Chinese Communists in the wake of the anticipated World War II. The declaration was made by Manuilsky on Stalin's behalf. He said: "When the armed struggle is ended. . . the USSR will be the only state honestly ready to support the economic resurrection of China. Yet the Americans are sure that the USSR will for a long time be unable to come to the aid of the Chinese (Communist) working masses. . . . the American imperialists are going to miscalculate."

Did we miscalculate? An illuminating insight was provided by George F. Kennan, the newly appointed Ambassador to Moscow.

Mr. Kennan said: "I remember Stalin one time said in effect: 'What the hell do you think we can give China?' He said: 'We have a hundred cities of our own to build in the Soviet Far East. If anybody is going to give anything to the Far East, I think it's you.' And I think he was speaking quite sincerely."

Mr. Kennan was the author of the celebrated article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which appeared in the magazine Foreign Affairs in 1947 under the signature of Mr. "X." This article defined and staked out our policy of "containment" of communism.

West Didn't Read Enough. By now it appears the West has fallen behind in its reading of Communist literature. Stalin's plan for China and the world are set forth in his unexpurgated "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question" and in the book "China in Revolt."

Published in 1927, these books are today the bible and blueprint of the most ruthless and efficient foreign policy ever devised. Only recently the Daily Worker hailed "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question" as Stalin's "major work." A new party pamphlet now on sale in Communist bookstores says that "like a powerful searchlight, it lights up the path of struggle."

In China, the path was long and tortuous. It turned and twisted in the hairpin curves of tactics, as was necessitated in specific circumstances. But always, since Stalin laid it out in 1927, its direction was fixed by the compass of strategy.

U.S. Misled by Tactics.

Because the State Department did not use Stalin's strategy as a point of reference for its own compass, it was misled by tactics. In his Senate testimony Secretary Acheson summed up the confusion on China which existed in the years 1944 through 1946:

"I could not see clearly as to what the outcome in China was going to be until . . . the dust settled. . . . Many years earlier, in his 'Foundations of Leninism,' Stalin had written: 'Strategy is the determination of the direction. . . . (It) remains essentially unchanged. . . . Tactics are a part of strategy, subordinate and subservient to it. Tactics change according to the situation of the matter and the laws of advance. The whole point of the matter is that the (Communist) party does understand them and carries them out in practice.'"

Forrestal's Discovery.

In 1945, while Mr. Acheson was waiting for the dust to settle, the late James F. Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, was straining his eyes to see through the dust. Tortured by realizations that were to drive him to suicide, Secretary Forrestal tried to discover how much our government really knew about basic Communist strategy. He sought to learn whether anybody had made a comprehensive study of the Russian state philosophy and the theoretical basis of Soviet foreign policy.

In his diary, dated Jan. 7, 1946, there is this entry: "There is no place in government where such a study has been made—at least I have been unable to find one."

TOMORROW: Pattern of Revolt

HOLD FOR RELEASE

REVOLT — OVERNIGHT

Third of a Series

By DAVID SNELL,

Staff Writer.

Communist revolutions are in progress throughout Asia and the Middle East. They are moving steadily toward completion, with little hindrance from the U.S. Wherever the non-Communist world touches that of the Communists on a land boundary, the struggle is in a crucial stage. Communism is spreading like wet ink on a blotter.

Many years ago, Joseph Stalin wrote: "When a life-and-death struggle is being waged and is spreading between proletarian Russia and the imperialist entente, only two alternatives confront the border regions."

No Third Choice.

"Either they join forces with Russia . . . or they join forces with the entente . . . There is no third solution."

You can find that passage in Stalin's unexpurgated "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question," where he exposed the plan of conquest that has enslaved 600,000,000 persons in only five years.

Published in 1927, the book is today the bible and blueprint of Soviet foreign policy. It reveals in detail the procedures by which Russia exports revolution to the colonial and dependent borderlands. It tells how Stalin hopes to keep those borderlands like a row of dominoes.

Gave Away Secret.

Smugly confident that the West would never comprehend until too late, Stalin gave away this vital trade secret:

"What is the fundamental position from which Communist revolutionaries approach problems of the revolutionary movement in colonial and dependent countries?"

"It is a strict differentiation between revolution in imperialist countries, countries that oppress other peoples, and revolutions in colonial and dependent countries, countries that suffer from the imperialist oppression of other states."

"The fundamental mistake of the opposition is that they do not understand and will not admit this difference between one type of revolution and the other type of revolution."

Two Sets of Rules.

In other words, one set of rules applies in countries like the United States and Great Britain. Another set holds for the Asiatic and Middle Eastern countries that now are Stalin's primary target.

Stalin emphasized that whatever the type, no Communist revolution just happens. A revolution is like a house. You cannot build the roof before the foundation and supporting walls are installed. And this is important: laying the foundation is just as vital—and how—as nailing on the shingles.

Incidentally, it is interesting to note that while Stalin claims to have destiny in his corner and credits his victories to the logic of history, he urges Communists everywhere to lend destiny and history a hand.

Counts on U.S. Pals.

Also, Stalin does not rely entirely on the format for colonial-style revolution and its application by native Communists in the lands for which it was designed. He counts on his pals in the United States to help.

"No lasting victory can be achieved in colonial and dependent countries," Stalin wrote, "unless a real bond is established between the movement for emancipation in these countries and the proletarian movement in the West."

The "Programme of the Communist International" adds this:

"The tasks of the Communist International connected with the revolutionary struggle in colonies, semicolonies and dependencies are of the most important strategic tasks in the world."

This (victory) cannot be achieved unless the closest cooperation is maintained between the proletariat in the oppressing countries and the toiling masses in the oppressed countries.

"The Communist parties in the imperialist countries must render systematic aid to the colonial revolutionary movement . . . by all means in their power."

Road to West.

This was Stalin's quintessential plan way of saying that Communists the world over must work as a team. The sinister meaning of this was demonstrated at Yalta, where President Roosevelt presumably received advice on China from Alger Hiss.

It is unlikely that the world will ever learn precisely what Hiss told President Roosevelt — unless Hiss himself decides to disclose it. But of this one can be sure:

Hiss did not tell President Roosevelt something every Communist knows very well: a quarter of a century ago, Stalin designated Asia and the Middle East as "the road to victory over the West."

Today communism is marching that road.

" . . . the victory of the (world) proletarian revolution," writes the Russian theoretician E. A. Dunaev in a current party pamphlet, "is impossible without the support of the oppressed and exploited peoples of the colonies . . ."

"After World War II the national-colonial problem became exceptionally important and acute. . . ."

"The Soviet solution of the . . . problem is no secret."

No secret?

Back Door Open.

In anticipation of a direct military attack through the front door of Europe, the West is in frenzied defensive preparation. But the type of door—in Asia and the Middle East—is open and unguarded.

No secret?

The West has yet to understand fully that Stalin is building revolutions behind its back, or that Stalin is fighting—and winning—a creeping war.

No secret?

The West is trying to "contain" communism — without any clear idea of what it is trying to contain.

TOMORROW — The Creeping War.

HOLD FOR RELEASE

CHINESE--WITH OVERVIEW

Fourth of a series.

By DAVID SNELL,

Staff Writer.

Joseph Stalin is fighting a creeping war—and counting upon the West to lose it by default. It is being fought in the colonial, semicolonial and dependent lands of Asia and the Middle East, and in Africa and South and Central America. The battle cry is "Death to imperialism!"

Throughout the primary target area, which is Asia and the Middle East, Stalin is building revolutions by stages—and hoping his enemies will not wake up to the fact until it is too late.

For each country the revolutionary stages are three. They follow the classic formula that was tested successfully in China.

Foreigners the Target.

"The distinguishing feature of the first stage," wrote Stalin, "is that it was directed mainly against foreign oppression."

Today, in Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Morocco, open and concealed Communists—with plenty of unwitting popular support—are howling for the scalps of foreigners.

"Let us now proceed to the second stage," Stalin continued. "It is that the edge of the revolution is now directed mainly against internal enemies."

In India, where the British no longer rule, the Communists have turned on Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and made of him the No. 1 bogey man. Nehru seems destined to become India's Chiang Kai-shek.

The third stage, wrote Stalin, is the "consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat." Then it is all over.

Stalin Confident.

The fire burning in the Middle East has been fanned relentlessly by Communist agents. This follows the classic blueprint, as set down in Stalin's unexpurgated "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question."

There, as elsewhere, Stalin feels confident of success. His confidence stems from a belief that the West will never accept the so-called backward nations as full and equal partners.

"National equality and . . . friendly collaboration between nations," he wrote, "are unachievable and inconceivable under the rule of capitalism."

It goes almost without saying that the Communists shouting the slogans of nationalism are insincere. The "Programme of the Communist International" is explicit on this point:

"When a revolutionary situation is developing, the party advances certain transitional slogans and demands corresponding to the concrete situation; but these demands and slogans must be bent to the revolutionary aim of capturing power."

Erastate Nationalism.

Once in power, the Communists swiftly eradicate the nationalism that helped bring them to power. The Russian theoretician E. A. Dunayeva writes:

"If the survivals of nationalism . . . are not combatted, they may revive and cause considerable harm. . . . It must not be forgotten that the reactionary forces of the capitalist world that surrounds us are trying by various ways and means to smuggle the corrupt bourgeois ideology into our country. . . . Soviet people must be uncompromising in their hostility to all manifestations and survivals of nationalism."

So much for the regard of Communists for nationalism. But what does it matter if they are insincere when they shout "Egypt for the Egyptians!"?

They would shout that the moon is green cheese if it would help them win unwitting mass support among native populations. Without such support the cause of the revolution is lost, Stalin wrote:

"The misfortune of the opposition in fact is that they do not recognize this simple Leninist rule for leading the millions: that . . . the party alone, . . . without the support of the millions, is incapable of accomplishing a revolution."

Charging Strategy.

Thus, in 1926, Stalin declared in a speech to the Chinese commission of the Communist International, while the Chinese revolu-

tion was in its first stage: "the masses must be mobilized around the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist party."

Later, he explained: "We always said that it was impossible to adopt the policy of discrediting and replacing the . . . Kuomintang leadership before it had run its course as a bourgeois revolutionary government, and that it must first be allowed to run its course before practically raising the question of replacing it."

As an example of how the formula works today, consider the Philippines.

On July 4, 1946, the independent Republic of the Philippines was proclaimed in accordance with the Tydings-McDuffie Act passed by the Congress of the United States in 1934. While this obviously was in no way the doing of Communists, it served to advance the revolution in that country to the second stage.

When Mrs. Aurora Quezon, widow of the first President of the Philippines, Manuel Quezon, was assassinated and slain by Communist-led Huk guerrillas in April, 1948, a shock wave shuddered through the free world.

Raising the Question.

Mrs. Quezon was a symbol of Philippine independence. Her voice had spoken eloquently against communism. Her assassination was the sign that "the bourgeois revolutionary government" had run its course, and that the Communists were "raising the question of replacing it."

Today, the Huk guerrillas are a considerable striking force. Their operations are expanding. The Communist revolution in the Philippines is in its third and final stage.

In all three stages of that or any other colonial-style Communist revolution, wrote Stalin, "intense work must be carried on with the help of concealed Communists."

On that point, consider India. The Communists have endeavored to plant their agents in the Indian government at all levels. These agents can commit espionage, influence state policy in accordance with party line and, when the opportune time arrives, assist in the liquidation of non-Communist officials. All the while, the Chinese Red army is poised to spring from Tibet.

How to Identify Them?

How can these concealed Communists be identified? Sometimes we may suspect them by their deeds. Take, for example, Sardar K. M. Panikkar, India's Ambassador to Communist China and temporary member of the Indian delegation to the United Nations. Mr. Panikkar has shown an alarming affection for the regime of Mao Tse-tung, the Red butcher of China. As recently as last October Mr. Panikkar was assuring his nation and the world that Mao does not toe the Moscow line. He praised Mao for setting in motion "a dynamic social revolution" by implementing our old pal, the agrarian reform.

He hailed as an "achievement" Mao's establishment of a "powerful central government," and even defended China's aggression in Korea as "an aspect" of China's traditional interest in the peninsula. He said that in Korea Mao was not carrying out any particular Soviet directive.

Serves Useful Purpose.

What Mr. Panikkar failed to report was Stalin's promise that Red China would "become a magnet for all the peoples of the yellow race . . . a major power on the Pacific . . . (and) a menacing threat for . . . three continents."

Nor did he report that Red China was assigned by Stalin the task of dealing India the coup de grace through the political and military role of the Chinese army.

Whether Mr. Panikkar actually is a Communist is impossible to say. It really doesn't matter. He serves a useful purpose to Communists.

You don't have to look too closely to find Mr. Panikkar's counterpart in Egypt, Iran and every other country of the target area. You'll find him in high places, calling for closer ties with the Soviet Union and openly antagonistic toward the West.

World War III is the creeping

TOMORROW: Is Tito a Tito?

HOLD FOR RELEASE

TITO's overnite — 15—McC Yugoslavia's voting record even

Fifth of a Series.

By DAVID SNEEL,

Staff Writer.

By accepting on face value the Stalin-Tito "feud," the United States may be walking into a trap of error, that his feud with Tito is genuine.

This newspaper reveals today for the first time the startling fact that—a full quarter of a century ago—Stalin planned a "split" between a Communist Yugoslavian regime and the Soviet bloc.

It happened just as he planned it.

Stalin foresaw World War II in Europe and correctly estimated that it would bring communism to power in Yugoslavia. He planned for Yugoslavia to "secede" from the Soviet bloc—to gain "national territorial autonomy"—in the wake of that war.

As audacious and cunning as any subterfuge ever devised by the Kremlin's malignant genius, Stalin's plan for Yugoslavia—as originally conceived—throws new light on the Stalin-Tito rift.

Book Contains Clues.

The plan is found in Stalin's book "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question" (unexpurgated), providing important clues that bear on the true nature of the feud and its possible usefulness to the Soviet Union. This book is today the bible and blueprint of Soviet foreign policy, but it is little known in the United States outside of Communist circles.

Published in 1927, the book shows that Stalin drafted his Yugoslavian "secession" program two years earlier and called upon the Communist party of Yugoslavia to adopt it officially. Neither Yugoslavia nor the international Communist movement has ever renounced it.

Significantly, Yugoslavia and China were the only countries singled out for special discussion in the book. The reason, as advanced by Stalin, was that both would vary from the normal pattern of revolution in colonial and dependent nations. Stalin devoted an entire chapter to each.

The Chinese revolution, Stalin explained, varied from the norm because of the predominance of military questions. The Chinese Red army was destined to win the revolution, assist in the spread of communism elsewhere and defend the Soviet Union.

Two Factors in Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia, Stalin pointed out, required special consideration because of two factors:

1. Like the Soviet Union, it had to deal with the problem of national entities within its borders, and, more importantly...
2. It enjoyed a "special position" in regard to international relations.

"We must... bear in mind the circumstance that Yugoslavia is not a fully independent country... and that... she cannot escape the great play of forces that is at work outside Yugoslavia," Stalin wrote.

"If you are drawing up a national program for the Yugoslav party—and this is precisely what we are dealing with—you must remember that this program must be based on... what is developing and what will inevitably occur by virtue of international relations. That is why I think that the question of... self-determination should be regarded as an immediate and burning question.

"Now about the national program of the Yugoslav Communist party. As the starting point... we must postulate a Soviet revolution in Yugoslavia... It is imperative to include in the national program a special point on... secession.

"Finally, the program should include a special point providing for national territorial autonomy... in Yugoslavia..."

Foresaw War.

Stalin wrote that the question of autonomy would have to be resolved during or following World War II—the coming of which he clearly foresaw.

"Even if we admit that at the moment this question is not an immediate one," he wrote, "it might definitely become immediate if war begins, or when war begins... That war will inevitably begin and that they over there (Germany, England and France) are bound to come to blows, there can be no doubt..."

When the present "territorial autonomy" for Yugoslavia was created in June, 1948, with an announcement by the Cominform of the Stalin-Tito split, the non-Communist world whooped for joy. Nobody called attention to the fact that "territorial autonomy" had no Stalinist infiltrator can get been planned as early as 1925.

Instead, we jumped happily to the conclusion that here was a falling out of thieves and a portent of the crumbling of the entire Soviet Communist structure. We wasted little time clasping the butcher Tito in almost loving embrace, accepting his word that he was Stalin's enemy.

Didn't Oppose Soviet Union.

Curiously, we paid scant attention to what Yugoslavia was doing in the United Nations. We immediately noticed that the Yugoslav delegation never once stood against the Soviet bloc when the chips were really down.

Indeed, this reporter has not been able to discover through the press division of the American delegation that a tabulation of

Yugoslavia's voting record even exists. Although Stalin actually planned a Yugoslavian "secession" and it happened squarely according to his timetable, it is possible, however, that his feud with Tito is genuine.

Any doubt of its authenticity would be erased if Stalin were to enter fully into the Western alliance and welcome Gen. Eisenhower's troops to Yugoslavian soil—which Tito has given no sign that he even contemplates doing.

Guinea or not, the fact is that the split is useful to Stalin and has in no way weakened him in the international picture. One need only to look at the map to see why.

Key to Satellite Defense.

What are the "external factors" that underlay Stalin's "secession" plan? Geographically, Yugoslavia holds the key to the defense of Stalin's Eastern European satellites. Against her borders are Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.

—whose peoples might welcome a liberating army. Yugoslavia shields Europe's soft under-belly.

Bound up with this unique geographic situation is the all-important question of the role Yugoslavia will play in any new European war.

Three courses are open to Tito: He could fight on the side of the Allies or on the side of Stalin. Or he could remain "neutral."

If Tito takes sides either way, an Allied attack could be launched against Stalin through Yugoslavian territory. But if he remains neutral, no Allied soldier, under the rules of neutrality, could touch Yugoslavia.

A neutral Yugoslavia would seal off the under-belly of Europe more effectively than 100 Red divisions could do it.

Up to now, Tito has given absolutely no assurance that he would standon neutrality. We have only his vague, Aesopian mumbo-jumbo about standing "on the side of peace."

Independence An Illusion.

What would be the character of Yugoslavian "neutrality?" Would it be genuine neutrality? Again, Stalin provides the clue.

When a life-and-death struggle exists between proletarian Russia and the imperialist entente, only two alternatives exist: they join forces with Russia... or they join forces with the entente. There is no third solution. So called independence... is only an illusion.

Thus, an illusionary "neutrality" in Yugoslavia would mask complete alliance with the Soviet Union. The practical advantages, from Stalin's standpoint, are at once apparent.

1. A neutral Yugoslavia would shield Europe's under-belly.

2. It would provide Stalin with an outlet to the warm waters of the Mediterranean, enabling him to receive strategic supplies and materials from Asia and the Middle East 12 months in the year.

3. It would provide Stalin with a point of liaison with secret Communist couriers from the free world, playing for him the role that neutral Portugal played for Hitler in World War II.

Let Resistance Forces.

Who is Tito? He is Josef Broz, an old-line Communist agent and professional revolutionary. Hand-picked by Stalin, Tito went into Yugoslavia in World War II with the mission of grabbing control of the resistance forces of the heroic Cel. Dr. Draza Mihailovich.

Following the classic pattern, Tito tried to form a coalition or united front with Mihailovich, who wouldn't buy it. England, and then the United States, sided with Tito. Mihailovich was thrown to the wolves.

With the collapse of the Nazis, Tito set up a typical puppet government, staffed at all levels by eligible Moscow-trained Communists. But came the Stalin-Tito split and the whole crowd of them went along with Tito—or so we are asked to believe.

Let's face it. Communists just can't behave that way. When Earl Browder was expelled from the American Communist party on orders from Moscow, his supposedly loyal pals turned on him like so many cobras.

'Erd Justifies Means.'

If Tito really is so dangerous to the Communist cause as the open party press would have us believe, why hasn't Stalin ordered his assassin? Is it possible that within pistol range?

Moreover, Tito himself concedes that he is a Communist. That being so, he wouldn't object to stringing the butcher especially one so useful to the Tito in almost loving embrace, accepting his word that he was Stalin's enemy.

Meanwhile, Tito is fattening on Uncle Sam's bank account, and using American arms to consolidate his control over the Yugoslavian slave people.

If Tito's "neutrality" is the trap, his feud with the boss is the bait. Uncle Sam is gobbling the bait, but hasn't detected the strong odor of fish.

TOMORROW: What Stalin Fears.

HOLD FOR RELEASE

KREMLIN Overnote

Last of a Series.
By DAVID SNELL,
Staff Writer.

"The war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie," wrote Lenin, "is a hundred times more difficult, prolonged and complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states."

The legions of the Kremlin are pounding along the road of conquest that courses through Asia and the Middle East. But they do not march as conquering heroes, in the immaculate rectangles of dress parade. Instead, they stalk in the shadows of master conspiracy.

And they are winning.

Containment Policy.

The United States is officially committed to a belief that the Communist world carries within its bloodstream the germs of fatal illness.

In 1947, George F. Kennan, as the author of the famous "X" article in the magazine Foreign Affairs, projected for the United States "a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."

Years earlier, almost in anticipation of such words, Stalin had written: "Others think that the socialist offensive is a headlong march forward... the muddled heads... do not understand the class nature of the attack... Don Quixote also imagined he was attacking enemies when he attacked windmills. But we know he got only a bruised head..."

When the article appeared Mr. Kennan was chief of the policy planning staff of the State Department. On Dec. 26, 1951, President Truman appointed him Ambassador to Moscow. The Kremlin announced that the appointment was acceptable.

Overnight Change.

In formulating our "containment" policy, Mr. Kennan wrote: "If disunity were ever to seize and paralyze the (Communist) party, the chaos and weakness of Russian society would be revealed in forms beyond description... So, man's short-lived 'set-back' overnight from one of the strongest of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies... the possibility remains... and in the opinion of the writer it is a strong one—that Soviet power is a strong one—that Soviet power bears within itself the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of the seeds is well advanced."

But even as Mr. Kennan was writing of the sprouting of seeds, Kennan wrote that our "demands for the Soviet Union was reaping a harvest. The Chinese revolution forward in such a manner as to become a terrible reality. Two years and five months after the appearance of the 'X' article, the appearance of the Chinese government of China... the hour the Soviet world doubled its strength."

Wishful Thinking.

Meanwhile, wishful thinking remained an ingredient of American planning. It was an ingredient that was to manifest itself often and in curious ways.

As late as April, 1951, with the horror of Korea full upon us, Mr. Kennan, in another article in the magazine Foreign Affairs, found it possible to say: "... to what extent China can really be said to be part of the Soviet system we do not know..."

Here, in effect we are invited to settle into an easy chair, light up a pipe and dream of the possibility that Mao-Tse-tung will become a Tito. The fact is, as yesterday's article demonstrated, there is more than a reasonable doubt even that Tito is a Tito. The previous year, even as Communist artillery pounded American troops in Korea, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in an address to the United Nations, conjured up the old vision of a peace-loving, good neighbor Soviet Union.

"This perspective takes into account the possibility," he said, "that the Soviet government may not be inherently and unalterably committed to standing in the way of peace, and that it may some day accept a live-and-let-live policy..."

Possible Modification.

"Some modification of their aggressive policies may follow, if they then recognize that the best interests of the Soviet Union require a co-operative relationship with the world."

The previous year, 1949, in his letter of transmittal accompanying the State Department's White Paper on China, Mr. Acheson wrote: "We will not help the Chinese or ourselves by basing our policy on wishful thinking."

But with the very next sentence, look what turned up:

"We continue to believe that,

however tragic may be the immediate future of China... ultimately the profound civilization and the democratic individualism of China will reassert themselves and she will throw off the foreign yoke."

Communist Answer. Such has been the pattern of American official thinking. The Communists have an answer. In a Communist party pamphlet, the Soviet theoretician E. A. Dunayeva writes:

"One of the gravest blunders the Hitlerites committed was their banking on the breakdown of the commonwealth of Soviet nations." The nature of Stalin's creeping war is such that he has no fear of our efforts at "containment," which he regards—as his comment quoted above makes clear—as only a Quixotic gesture toward a windmill.

Writing of the "ebb and flow" of revolution, Stalin teaches that communism is fluid and cannot be contained. The State Department hopes to make communism hold still, but Stalin tells us it is always in stages of advance or retreat, and never stationary. What, then, does Stalin fear? He fears being thrown on the defensive. In the book "Leftwing Communism," Lenin writes: "Once the insurrection has begun it is necessary to act with the greatest determination, and, at all costs, on the offensive. The defense is the death of every armed rising."

Crucial Years.

Therein Lenin gives away a vital Communist secret, but the free world has disregarded it almost completely.

We ignored it in China in the crucial years 1946 and 1947, when we cut off aid to Chiang Kai-shek while the Communist armies actually were on the defensive and threatened with annihilation. We ignored it in Korea, when China was permitted to attack without being forced to defend her own territory.

We are ignoring it in the rest of Asia and the Middle East, where Communist revolutions are on the offensive, in the convenient absence of effective counterrevolutionary acts on our part.

The lone exception was the American program for Greece and Turkey, by which President Truman's short-lived "set-back" of the few total setbacks it has experienced. Given freely and with no strings attached, our aid to Greece and Turkey smashed two Communist revolutions—by throwing them on the defensive.

sheering of Weakness.

But with the formulation of the containment policy the State Department backed gracefully away from the get-tough policy. Mr. Kennan wrote that our "demands for the Soviet Union was reaping a harvest. The Chinese revolution forward in such a manner as to become a terrible reality. Two years and five months after the appearance of the 'X' article, the appearance of the Chinese government of China... the hour the Soviet world doubled its strength."

In other words, we returned to the old practice of failing, as Lenin put it, "to act with the greatest determination."

Any such failure, or any showing of weakness or indecision, serves only to spur the Communists to greater boldness. Lenin wrote:

"The decisive battle may be fully matured when all the class forces hostile to us have become sufficiently confused... when all the vacillating, wavering, unstable, intermediate elements... have sufficiently disoriented themselves through their practical bankruptcy."

"Then, indeed, revolution is ripe; then, indeed... our victory is assured."

These articles have exposed the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the weapons with which Communism fights its battles. They have laid bare Stalin's blueprint for world conquest as he himself drafted it. They have exposed our own mistakes as Stalin sees them.

Course Still Pursued.

They have demonstrated that Stalin's plan is and has been constant—and that it underlies all actions of the Communist movement.

"A course having been mapped out," Stalin wrote, "it must be pursued no matter what difficulties and complications may be encountered on the road."

The articles have demonstrated that the course mapped out by Stalin is being pursued—and is meeting with success at every turn.

But, most important, the articles have revealed Stalin's greatest fear: The fear of being thrown on the defensive.

It still is within the power of the free world to seize the initiative. It still is within the power of the free world to force Stalin to go on the defensive—politically, as well as militarily.

But the hour is late.